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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-REGULATION OF
AIRFARES-EUROPEAN COMMISSION MAY SANCTION ANTI-
COMPETITIVE MEASURES OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND
POSSIBLY FOREIGN AIRLINES AS EEC EXPANDS ITS ROLE IN AIR
TRANSPORT DOMAIN-"THE NEWEST FRONTIERS"
I. FACTS
In the mid 1980's two West German travel agencies' cir-
cumvented federal ticket price floors applicable to regularly
scheduled airline flights originating in Germany. They undercut
their competitors by purchasing cheaper tickets abroad for
flights making stop-overs in Germany, where their passengers
would first board. A German watchdog organization 2 brought
an action against the agencies in a German court, claiming
that the practice in fact violated the price floors and that
it constituted unfair competition.' The German court of first
instance found that the Federal measures indeed applied to
the practice and ordered the agencies to stop selling the
tickets in question.4 The German appellate court upheld the
decision against the agencies.' On appeal to the German Fed-
, The agencies, whose corporate headquarters were in Frankfurt, were Ahmed
Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH. Judgment of Jan. 30, 1986,
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court) (1st Civ. Chamber), suspended pending
E. Comm. Ct. J. prelim. ruling, W. Ger., [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 158 (1986).
2 The organization, Zentrale zur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.v., sought
to prevent unfair business practices. It complained of the travel agencies' practice
of purchasing Lisbon-Frankfurt-Tokyo tickets in London for prices up to 6007o below
those purchased in Germany for direct flights from Frankfurt to Tokyo because of
currency and regulatory differences. The passengers simply discarded the coupons
for the first leg of the flight. Addendum au rapport d'audience dans l'affaire 66/
86 [Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs
E.V.] 2.
1 The regulations the agencies were accused of violating were sections 21 and
21(a) of the LUFrVERKEHRSGESETZ (Civil Aviation Act) which forbade the practice
of applying air tariffs not approved by the competent federal minister. Judgment
of Jan. 30, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof (1st Civ. Chamber), W. Ger., [1986] 3 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 158, 160 (1986).
4Id.
, Id.
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eral Supreme Court, it agreed that the agencies were acting
unlawfully under German law. However, European Community
law, which possibly supercedes the German law in this case,
may dictate a different outcome. The German Federal Supreme
Court thus referred three questions to the Court of Justice
of the European Communities 6 for preliminary rulings pursuant
to Article 177 of the Treaty establishing the European Ec-
onomic Community.7
6 Id. at 159. See BROWN & JACOBS, Ti COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CommuNms 1-2 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter BROWN & JACOBS]. The twelve-member
Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Court), located in Luxembourg,
is the judicial organ of the supranational European Economic Community (EEC).
Its function is to "ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and
applications of [the EEC] Treaty." Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 164, U.N.T.S. 3, 111 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
Unlike the predominantly civil law courts of Europe, including the French Conseil
d'Etat after which it was modeled, the Court operates with a certain respect for
stare decisis. See Koopmans, Essays in European Law and Integration (1982), quoted
in BROWN & GARNER, FRENCH ADMINSTRATIvE LAW (1983).
Although the Court's way of formulating principles, or general propositions
of law, is closely akin to methods used by the French Conseil d'Etat, its
techniques of relying on previous cases, of invoking the authority of its
own case-law and of determining the ratio decidendi of earlier judgments
are not dissimilar to those used by the English common law courts.
Id. at 170.
7 Judgment of Jan. 30, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof (1st Civ. Chamber), W. Ger.,
[1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 158, 159 (1986). Article 177 of the EEC Treaty (also
known as the Treaty of Rome) is homologous to an interlocutory ruling on an issue
of law in the United States. The most important work of the Court is performed
via the Article 177 procedure. The Article provides in part that:
[T]he Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning: a) the interpretation of [the] Treaty... and that [w]here such
a question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a
Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision
on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court
of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 177. See van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse
Tariefcommissie, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, [1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105,
129 (1963).
[T]he task assigned to the [Court] under Article 177, the object of which
is to secure uniform interpretation of the Treaty by national courts and
tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged that Community law
has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those
courts and tribunals.
BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 151-78. The original signatories to the EEC
Treaty, which entered into force on 1 January 1958, are Belgium, The Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Denmark,
Ireland and The United Kingdom acceded to the European Community in 1973,
Greece in 1979, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Id. at 14, 19.
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The questions referred to the European Court concerned
the compatibility of the German regulations with the com-
petition regime established by Articles 5,8 85, 9  86,10 88,
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty provides:
[1] The Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general
or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community.
They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
[2] They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the
attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.
EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 5.
9 See Continental Can Co. v. E.C. Comm'n, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215,
244, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199, 224 (1973). "Articles 85 and 86 are designed
to achieve the same aim on different levels-the maintenance of effective competition
in the Common Market." See generally CAMPBELL, EC COMPEITION LAW: A PRAc-
TiTIONER's TEXTBOOK (1980). The articles form the basis of the EEC's rules governing
competition by "undertakings" which affects trade in the various Member States.
EEC Treaty, supra note 7, at art. 85. An "undertaking" is a privately run business
or corporation. European Court of Justice, Proposal for a Court of First Instance,
reprinted in [1988] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 185, 189 (1987) art. 3. See infra note 33.
Article 85 declares unlawful all cartels and other restrictive practices and agreements
creating them, but provides for exceptions in the public interest. No prior decision
by a Community institution is required for an anti-competitive agreement to be
found automatically void, even before it is performed. "The evils proscribed by
Article 85(1) are consensual arrangements and collusive parallelisms which cause
anticompetitive consequences and are capable of affecting trade in the Common
Market." Toepke, EEC COMPEITION LAW: BusiNEss IssuEs AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
IN COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST CASES §§ 221-22 (1982). In 1962 the Council "ac-
tivated" Articles 85 and 86 in what is known as "Regulation No. 17," thereby
empowering the Commission with oversight capacity of European competition prac-
tices. Council Regulations 17 Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, O.J.
EuR. CoMM. (No. 13) 204 (1962). However, the Regulation specifically eliminated
the transport sector from its scope. Id. at art. 1. To enforce the Treaty Articles,
the Commission was granted investigative powers, id. at art. 14, and the ability to
levy fines and periodic penalty payments to enforce its decisions, id. at arts. 15 &
16, subject to review by the European Court of Justice, id. at art. 17. The Com-
mission's jurisdiction does not extend to agreements between undertakings in one
Member State which do not relate to trade between the Member States. Id. at art.
4.
10 Article 86 prohibits the abuse of a "dominant position" by an undertaking
that may affect trade between the Member States. See Continental Can Co. v. E.C.
Comm'n, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, [1973] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199. Unlike
article 85, it makes no provision for a public interest exception. The abuse may
take on several forms:
1) [D]irectly or indirectly imposing unfair prices or other unfair trading
conditions; 2) [l]imiting production, markets, or technical development to
the prejudice of consumers; 3) [a]pplying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with third parties to their disadvantage; or 4) [m]aking the
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
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8911 and 9012 of the EEC Treaty with regard to the practice
of tariff fixing on regularly scheduled airline flights. The
first question was whether bi- or multilateral conventions
regulating airline ticket prices entered into by companies head-
quartered in a Member State of the European Community
could be found automatically void under Article 85(2) of
the EEC Treaty which outlaws cartel-like practices. 13 The sec-
ond question was whether the application of such mutually
agreed upon airline tariffs constituted an abuse of a "dom-
inant position" in the Common Market under Article 86.14
The third question was whether the implementation of such
price regulations by the authorities of a Member State was
incompatible with Article 5(2) and Article 90(1) 5 and thus
automatically voidable, notwithstanding the failure of the Eur-
opean Commission 16 to make a preliminary warning about
the practice.
plementary obligations which have no connection with the subject contracts.
ToEPKE, supra note 9, § 231. See also Commercial Solvents Corp. v. E.C. Comm'n.,
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, [1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309 (1974). Not only
does Article 86 cover abuses which may directly prejudice consumers, it may also
address abuses which indirectly harm them by distorting the competitive structure
outlined in article 3(0. Id. at 252, [1974] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 342. See generally
Note, The European Commission's ECS/AKZO Standard for Predatory Pricing in
the E.E.C.: Deterrence or Disorder?, 17 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 271 (1986). In
analyzing a case addressing an Article 86 issue, the author observed that the Com-
mission has refused to adopt a "per se test for predation based on marginal or
variable cost," nor "exactly which factors constitute predation." Instead, the Com-
mission poses as its test "whether ... price cutting or other behavior ... constitutes
unreasonable or unfair behavior intended to eliminate or damage the particular
competitor." Id. at 300 (citing Commission of the European Communities, Fifteenth
Report on Competition Policy 85 (1986)).
,1 Article 88 gives the Member States exclusive competence to regulate the ap-
plication of Articles 85 and 86 until the Council decides-under Article 87-to place
the competence in a particular regulatory domain within the purview of the EEC.
Absent Council initiative, Article 89 permits the Commission to investigate and make
only non-binding recommendations in regard to article 85 and 86 violations. EEC
Treaty, supra note 6, at arts. 87-89. See supra note 9.
12 Article 90 encourages the Member States to "neither enact nor maintain in
force any measure contrary to the rules contained in [the EEC Treaty]" in regards
to "public" undertakings and monopolies. EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 90.
See supra note 9.
13 EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 85(2).
14 See supra note 10.
15 See supra notes 8 & 12.
16 The Council, the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice are
the Community's institutions. The Council and Commission are the executive bodies
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In a highly publicized opinion, the Court ruled on the issues on
April 11, 1989. Regarding the first question, held, bilateral or mul-
tilateral agreements addressing airline tariffs for flights between Mem-
ber States, when at least one party is an airline with its registered
office in a Member State of the EEC are automatically void for
infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, unless exempted by
the Commission. In response to the second question, held, an airline
which abuses its "dominant position" in violation of Article 86 of
the Treaty is subject to sanctions by both its respective Member State
and the Commission. As to the third question, held, Article 5 of the
Treaty and recent Community legislation impose a duty on Member
States to neither adopt nor maintain in force any measure which
could deprive the competition rules of their effectiveness, absent proof
by the Member State that the measures are "indispensable" for
reasons of public policy. Importantly, the court left open the pos-
sibility that the European Community may enforce anti-competition
measures against certain non-EEC airlines in affirming a previous
holding in which it allowed limited Community jurisdiction over
certain practices affecting inter-Community trade. 7 Ahmed Saeed
Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur Be-
kampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E. V., No. 66/86, slip op. (E.
Comm. Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since 1944, air transport policy and airline competition have been
governed by a complex lattice of multi- and bilateral agreements
and are primarily responsible for producing Community legislation. The Council is
a political body whose members represent the interests of their individual states of
origin. The Commission is composed of representatives from each Member State
who, owing no allegiance to their state of origin, work to further Community goals.
The Commission prepares and enforces legislation. The Parliament is the only
popularly elected body in the Community, and it has limited budgetary and con-
sultative powers. COMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNIES, THIRTY YEARS OF
COMMUNITY LAW 3 (1983).
17 See, e.g., Minist~re Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1452,
11986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 206 (1986) (opinion of the Advocate General Lenz,
citing Tepea BV v. E.C. Comm'n), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, -, [1978]
3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 392, 415 (1978)). See also Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import
Export S.A., 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 949, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81 (1971).
The fact that a party to an undertaking is in a non-Member State does not prevent
the application of Article 85 so long as the agreement affects the Common Market.
Id. at 959, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 95.
19891
618 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 19:613
between and among individual states.'8 Since the formation of the
EEC in 1957 until just recently, European air transport has remained
largely sacrosanct from Common Market regulation. 19 Due to eco-
nomic, political and social motives, European airlines, especially the
national flag carriers, remained under national control and notoriously
aloof from free market influence. 20 Not surprisingly, the EEC Treaty
created only a framework within which a European air transport
policy could eventually be established. Article 84 simply affirmed the
Council's ability to develop a "common transport policy." 2' However,
the question eventually was posed whether Article 84 also insulated
European transport policy from the objectives set forth in the rest
1 See generally CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL AIm TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION: A
CASE STUDY OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION (1972). The Chicago con-
vention of 1944 and the Bermuda Agreement between the United States and Great
Britain in 1946 led to the establishment of an international treaty framework, managed
by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), a quasi-governmental body.
With the organization of the IATA international aviation is regulated by a series
of bilateral agreements between airlines and states. The agreements make provisions
for coordinated fares, tariffs, and route scheduling by airline companies and are
always subject to the approval of national governments (whose absolute sovereignty
over their airspace is affirmed in the Chicago Convention).
19 See Joliet, National Anti-Competitive Legislation and Community Law, 12
FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 163, 181 (1989). "Community air space is not subject to a
single controlling authority. Each Member State retains its sovereignty over the air
space above its territory." For purposes of competition regulation, this is the result
of the transportation exception found in "Article 17." See supra note 9.
20 Reed, Europeans Warily Eyeing 1992 Open Skies Deadline, Air Transport
World, Dec. 1987, at 20:
[Airline services] between the various countries in Europe continued to be
sewn up under [bilateral agreements] negotiated by governments. The bi-
laterals nominated the airlines that could fly, the fares that could be
charged-with the details handed down to the [IATA]-and provided for
pooling agreements under which departure timings were agreed, and revenue
split under an agreed formula .... The main problem is that Europe is a
conglomerate of countries, each with its own national language, currency,
law and-most importantly-pride.
See supra note 18.
21 Article 84 is a provision allowing the Council to decide whether and how to
implement a common policy for sea and air transport. EEC Treaty, supra note 6,
at art. 84. See Wood, Europe's Liberalisation of Air Services: An Update, 16 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 269 (1988). Prior to the enactment of the "Single European Act," Article
84(2) of the EEC Treaty provided, "The Council may, acting unanimously, decide
whether to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid
down for sea and air transport" (emphasis added). The Single European Act modified
the provision to allow the Council to act "by a qualified majority" (emphasis added).
Single European Act of February 17, 1986, 30 O.J. EuR. CoM. (No. L 169) 7
(1987).
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of the EEC Treaty and thereby removed every aspect of transport
policy from Community scrutiny. 22
In 1974 the Court answered this question in the negative. In Re:
French Merchant Seamen: E.C. Commission v. France, it held that
Article 84 could not be used to sanction measures contrary to the
goals of the Treaty. 23 France had promulgated laws establishing a
minimum ratio of French nationals on the crews of its merchant
shipping fleets, a practice which the Commission held to contravene
a regulation 24 intended to ensure the freedom of movement for migrant
workers guaranteed by Article 48 of the EEC Treaty. The Commission
commenced an Article 16921 procedure for failure to fulfill an EEC
treaty obligation against France and brought the case before the
Court. France argued that absent initiative by the Council, Article
84 removed transport policy, and consequently regulations pertaining
to seamen, from the ambit of the general provisions of the Treaty.
Thus, France claimed freedom to regulate the composition of the
crews on French ships without Community interference. The Court
disagreed. While it conceded that sea transport policy was indeed
exempted from Common Market policy initiatives, 26 it held that Ar-
ticle 84 could not exempt the Member States from the general rules
of the Treaty outside of the provisions of Title IV of Part 2 which
2 See Ministre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, -, [19861
3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 195 (1986) (opinion of the Advocate General Lenz). "The
legal effect of Article 84 was initially disputed. There was doubt [before 1973] as
to whether it excluded sea and air transport solely from the scope of Title IV on
transport or whether it had the much more sweeping effect of excluding those forms
of transport from the terms of the EEC Treaty as a whole." See infra note 30.
23 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216, 217 (1974).
24 Two means by which the Council and Commission legislate Community policy
are the "regulation" and the "directive." A regulation is "binding in its entirety"
on the Member States and is applicable, word for word, by the Member States. A
directive, "binding as to the result to be achieved," is a more generally worded
means of defining a community objective which the Member States are obliged to
translate into national legislation. EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 189.
25 Article 169 of the EEC Treaty provides:
[1] If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill
an obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the
matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its ob-
servations.
[2] If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the
period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before
the Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 169. See BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 75-
82.
26 See supra note 21.
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establish the framework for a common transport policy. 27 In this
case, the general rule was the obligation of the Member States to
respect the freedom of movement of migrant workers guaranteed in
the Treaty. 2
A landmark 1986 decision extended the principle applied to the
freedom of movement of migrant workers in sea transport in French
Merchant Seamen to the area of freedom of competition in air
transport. In Ministre Public v. Asjes (Nouvelles Frontires),29 the
Court affirmed that Article 84(2) cannot insulate a Member State
from its general obligations under the EEC Treaty, and specifically
from competition Articles 3(f),30 5,31 and 85.32 Several criminal actions
had been brought against the executives of airlines and travel agencies
who had violated the French Civil Aviation Code33 by selling airline
tickets not approved by the appropriate national agency. The Tribunal
de Police de Paris (Local Criminal Court) considered the issue of
whether the national price regulations were incompatible with Article
85(1) and thus unenforceable under the EEC Treaty.3 4 It was the
French court's view that the regulations made provision for a con-
certed action between airlines in violation of Article 85. It stayed the
proceedings to ask the Court for an Article 177 preliminary ruling
on the question. 3
The European Court addressed the issue of whether the national
court of a Member State may rule that "concerted tariff practices
27 Part 2 of the Treaty encompasses the "Foundations of the Community." EEC
Treaty, supra note 7, at pt. 2. Title IV addresses the common transportation policy.
Id. at tit. IV.
1 Re: French Merchant Seamen: E.C. Comm'n v. France, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 359, 371, [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 216, 229 (1974). See EEC Treaty,
supra note 6, at arts. 48-51.
29 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, [19861 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173 (1986).
30 Article 3(f) provides that:
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community
shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with the time-
table set out therein...
(f) the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common
market is not distorted.
EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 3(f).
11 See supra note 8.
32 See supra note 9.
13 See CODE DE L'AVIATION crvmE, arts. L 330-3, R 330-9, R 330-15, reprinted
in Minist~re Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1454-56 (French
language version, not reprinted in Comm. Mkt. L.R.).
34 1986 E. Comm. -Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1459, [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 210.
31 Id. at 1460, [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 210. See supra note 7.
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between airlines" are contrary to Article 85 where (1) the Council
had yet to adopt Article 87 measures addressing airline competition
policy, (2) the Commission had made no decision pursuant to Article
89 in the same respect, and (3) the specialized air transport authorities
of the Member State had made no decision pursuant to Article 88
addressing the particular practice.3 6 The Court held that such an
"agreement, decision or concerted practice" affecting undertakings
in the airline industry could not come within the automatic voidance
language of Article 85(2) because it would violate the "general prin-
ciple of legal certainty. "3 7 Any decision made under the Article would
likely be arbitrary. Therefore, while Article 85 applied in principle
to the domain of air transport, the obligations it created were unen-
forceable absent appropriate legislation from the Council, Commis-
sion, or a Member State.38 Thus, a national court acting on its own
initiative is not empowered to hold such anti-competitive practices
automatically void pursuant to Article 85(2). 39 The Court did not,
36 Id. at 1469, [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 217-18 (1986). See supra note 11.
37 See COLIN, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES DANS LES COMMUNAUTtS EUROPIENNES
115-16 (1966). The Court often applies the general principles of law which it derives
from the various national legal systems in its judgments. Here, it decided that if
the rules of legal certainty were not upheld it would "have the effect of prohibiting
and rendering automatically void certain agreements, even before it is possible to
ascertain whether Article 85 as a whole is applicable to those agreements." 1986 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1469, [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 218.
31 In effect, the Treaty only provided for the Member States themselves to police
the application of the freedom of competition within their own national borders.
The Commission only had the power to give a reasoned opinion to the Member
States regarding what it considered to be anti-competitive practices that were not
justifiable under Article 85(3):
Articles 88 and 89 were not of such a nature as to ensure the complete
and consistent application of Article 85. Article 88 envisaged a decision by
the authorities of the Member States on the permissibility of agreements
only where the latter were submitted for their approval within the framework
of the laws relating to competition in their respective countries. Article 89,
while conferring on the Commission a general power of surveillance and
control, enabled it only to take note of possible violations of Articles 85
and 86 without giving it the power to grant declarations under Article 85(3).
Id. at 1450, [1986] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 204 (opinion of the Advocate General
Lenz, citing Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmBh,
1962 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 45, [1962] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283 (1962), holding
that, in principle, Article 85 has been applicable from the time of entry into force
of the Treaty, only not by the Community institutions).
39 Ministre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1470, [19861 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 219 (1986). See supra note 9. See also Bethell v. Sabena,
[1983] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1983) (Q.B. Div'l Ct.). The English Court dismissed
the action brought by a Member of the European Parliament against Sabena airlines
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however, rule on the question of whether the application of Article
86 in the same manner would violate the "legal certainty" require-
ment.40
Moreover, the Court found that other portions of the EEC Treaty
may indeed impose certain obligations on the Member States in air
transport competition questions.
The Court looked to Articles 3(f) and 5 to find a provision that
could be applied to a Member State absent Council or Commission
legislation and absent the adoption of any self-policing measures by
the Member State itself.4' It referred to a 1977 decision42 where it
interpreted Articles 3(f) and 5 to hold Member States to a duty not
to enforce or adopt measures which could deprive Articles 85 and
86 of their effectiveness. 43 Consequently, Article 5, the self-policing
procedures laid down in Article 88, and the procedure empowering
the Commission to make a reasoned decision under Article 89(2) do
establish a duty on the Member States to respect the provisions of
Article 85-even though the Council had yet to adopt rules pursuant
to Article 87." Nevertheless, under the language of the Treaty a
under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty for damages from allegedly charging
an unfair price for an airline ticket. The court held that a request to Luxembourg
for an Article 177 ruling would not be warranted because there had been insufficient
discovery and the costs of performing adequate discovery would likely be prohibitive.
The court did note, however, that by virtue of the provisions of Article 88, "some
effect lies in Article 85 and Article 86 from the very outset." Yet, because "there
are endless possibilities as to the scope of the application" of the articles and "[there
may be a vast difference in applicability" depending on the particular situation,
there is no way to know the exact applicability of the Articles. Id. at 8 & 9. See
supra note 9.
40 Article 86 has neither the automatic language of Article 85(2) nor any provision
for an exception to its effects as provided in Article 85(3). See supra note 10.
4' See supra note 8.
42 G.B.-Inno-B.M. NV v. Vereniging van de Kleinhandelaars in Tabak, 1977 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2115, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 283 (1977). The Belgian
government had enacted a tax policy that allowed dominant tobacco firms to maintain
cigarette prices at artificially high levels. Inno sold the tobacco below the government-
mandated price, was sued and ordered to stop the practice. It appealed to the Belgian
Court of Cassation (the highest administrative court) which asked for an Article
177 preliminary ruling from the European Court. The Court held that even though
abuse of a dominant position under Article 86 was encouraged by the "national
legislative provision," the Article nevertheless directly applies to the practice and it
is prohibited. Id. at 2151, [1978] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 320.
41 Ministre Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1472, [1986] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 220 (1986). See supra note 10.
Judge Joliet noted that:
[In Nouvelles Frontres, the European court] directed the national court
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Community institution could not enforce this duty. 45 Contrary to
some expectations, the Nouvelles Frontibres decision did not have a
direct liberalizing impact on European air transport.46 Further, the
issue of whether a Community institution could enforce Articles 85
or 86 against an undertaking located outside of EEC territory was
not entirely resolved.
The scope of the EEC's jurisdiction is a controversial issue. In his
opinion in Nouvelles Frontires, the Advocate General 47 grounding
his position on the 1972 decision in LC.L v. E.C. Commission (one
of the "Dyestuffs" cases),4 argued that if the undertakings were in
principle located outside the Community, the Commission could still
impose sanctions upon them. 49 The L C.L Court found that the Com-
mission does have jurisdiction to impose fines for Article 85 in-
fringements against undertakings whose registered offices are outside
of Community territory where sufficient economic unity exists between
to take account of the nature of the approved tariffs. If the tariffs were
the subjects of concerted action criticized by the competent national au-
thorities, under Article 88, or by the Commission, under Article 89(2), they
may not be approved, since that would reinforce the effects of prohibited
concerted action. The national court must, therefore, in those circumstances
refrain from imposing the penalties provided for by national law. [footnotes
omitted].
Joliet, National Anti-Competitive Legislation and Community Law, 12 FoRDnRAM
INT'L L.J. 163, 182 (1989). See supra note 11.
45 Minist~re Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1472, [1986] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 220 (1986). See supra note 11.
46 See Wood, Europe's Liberalisation of Air Services: An Update, 16 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 269 (1988).
[Ilt seemed to many that the Nouvelles Frontires decision would have an
immediate and direct impact on European air transport and in particular
on the prices that individuals are required to pay for it .... [This] ex-
pectation proved false.
47 The Advocate General is a member of the Court, yet he maintains an inde-
pendent role as an advisor to it. He reviews the facts and argues his opinion on
the case in order to help the Judges reach a decision. He can be likened to an
"institutionalized amicus curiae" in common law practice. "[H]is opinion, while it
may have authority in future cases, does not of course decide the instant case, even
provisionally.... He can also range beyond the questions for immediate decision."
BROWN & JACOBS, supra note 6, at 54-57; see also EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at
art. 166.
, Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
619, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557 (1972).
49 Minist~re Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1451, [1986] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 206 (1986). Articles 85 and 86 are drafted in broad language
and make no reference to limitations on the Community's jurisdiction to enforce
them. EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at arts. 85 & 86.
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the undertaking and a subsidiary located in the Community. °
The LC.I. criteria were expanded under the international law prin-
ciple of "objective territoriality"'" in the 1988 Wood pulp decision. 2
The Commission found that certain wood pulp producing firms had
concerted to fix market prices for their European Community cus-
tomers to whom they exported their products directly or via branches,
subsidiaries, agencies or other intermediaries. The Commission thus
fined several Finnish, Swiss, Canadian and American wood pulp
producers and associations for Article 85 infringements. They ap-
pealed the decision to the European Court. The Court held that where
undertakings "implement" a violative agreement in the European
'0 The Commission had investigated the practices of dyestuffs manufacturers to
determine whether price increases in the product since 1964 were due to a common
agreement between the enterprises. Eventually, it fined some sixty companies both
within and without the EC in an Article 85(1) procedure. Two Swiss companies and
one British company (at the time the United Kingdom was not a member of the
EC) with subsidiaries in the EC were among the appellants in several cases decided
by the European court. They raised lack of jurisdiction, inter alia, as a defense.
Although the Commission espoused a much wider standard of jurisdiction, including
the "effects doctrine," the Court limited its scope to the theory that the subsidiaries
and the parent companies were so closely identified as to constitute a single economic
unit. Even though the subsidiary had a separate legal personality, it did not act in
an autonomous manner. Thus, it found the parent company to be legally present
in the Community. Imperial Chem. Indus. v. E.C. Comm'n, 1972 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 619, 661-62, [1972] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 557, 629 (1972). See also Re: the
Wood Pulp Cartel: Ahlstrom Oy v. E.C. Comm'n, 1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -
[19881 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901 (1988) (opinion of the Advocate General Darmon):
[I]t is unclear whether the concept of effect provided for in Article 85 of
the EEC Treaty in order to establish the existence of an infringement of
the competition rules is identical to that required by Community law, and
accepted by international law, in order to determine whether there is ju-
risdiction over undertakings established outside the Community.
Id. at -, [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 930.
1' Re: Wood Pulp Cartel: Ahlstrom Oy v. E.C. Comm'n, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. -, [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901 (1988). In his opinion, the Advocate
General referred to the "undisputed basis" of jurisdiction of "territoriality" in
international law. This concept "has given rise to two distinct principles of juris-
diction: ... subjective" and "objective" territoriality. The former recognizes a
state's ability "to deal with acts which originated within its territory, even though
they were completed abroad." The latter recognizes a state's ability "to deal with
acts which originated abroad but which were completed, at least in part, within its
own territory." Id. at -, [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 920 (1988) (opinion of
the Advocate General Darmon) (referring to Higgins, The Legal Bases of Jurisdiction,
in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 3 (Olmstead
ed. 1984) [hereinafter Olmstead].
12 Re: Wood Pulp Cartel: Ahlstrom Oy v. E.C. Comm'n, 1988 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. -, [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901 (1988) (Joliet, Juge rapporteur).
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Community the Commission may obtain jurisdiction over them-
regardless of whether they have branches, subsidiaries, or agents in
the Community.53 Unfortunately for foreign entities doing business
in the EEC, the new jurisdictional criteria are not well-defined.14 In
addition, the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction of a Community
institution over air transport questions is complicated by collateral
national agreements.
Article 234 of the EEC Treaty obscures the question of the ap-
plicability of Articles 85 and 86 to air transport. EEC measures and
objectives supersede agreements made between two Member States
prior to their accession to the EEC. Yet, Article 23415 maintains in
3 The Court upheld the Community's expanded jurisdiction to apply the sanctions:
The producers in this case implemented their pricing agreement within the
Common Market. It is immaterial in that respect whether or not they had
recourse to subsidiaries, agents, sub-agents, or branches within the Com-
munity in order to make their contacts with purchasers within the Com-
munity. [paragraph omitted]
Accordingly the Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules
to such conduct is covered by the territoriality principle as universally
recognised in public international law.
Re: Wood Pulp Cartel: Ahlstrom Oy v. E.C. Comm'n, 1988 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. -, [1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901, 941 (1988).
-- The court's use of the theory of "territoriality" did not precisely
define the jurisdictional criteria by which it will abide in the future. See
generally Note, The Wood pulp Case: The Application of European Ec-
onomic Community Competition Law to Foreign Based Undertakings, 19
GA. J. INT'L L. 149, 150 (1989). The author provides an overview of
principles of extra-territorial jurisdiction in light of the Wood pulp decision
and concludes that the Luxembourg Court has failed to establish "a standard
of jurisdiction that adequately defines Community policy concerning com-
petition regulation other than to reaffirm the broad scope of application
exercised by the Commission in this case." See also Waelbroeck, The
European Community Approach, in Olmstead, supra note 51. Professor
Waelbroeck, writing before the Wood pulp decision, found that the effects
doctrine could be a "potential weapon, which the Community could use
on the international scene if necessary." Id. at 76.
" Article 234 provides:
[1] The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before
the entry into force of this Treaty between one or more Member States on
the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be
affected by the provisions of this Treaty.
[2] To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty,
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to
eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where nec-
essary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a
common attitude ....
EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 234.
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effect the maze of IATA agreements entered into between non-EEC
states and Member States prior to their entry into the EEC-even if
they are technically incompatible with the objectives of the Treaty.56
The EC institutions are thus precluded from addressing practices
already covered by such agreements.
After Nouvelles Frontiares it appeared that in order for a Com-
munity institution to be able to sanction a non-Member State un-
dertaking in the air transport sector it would have to surmount the
triple hurdle of (1) a lack of initiative on the part of the Council or
Commission to enact measures regulating competition in the sector
and the "legal certainty" factor; (2) the nebulous jurisdictional criteria
of the LC.I. and Wood pulp cases; and (3) Article 234 and its
guarantee of the existing system of international air transport agree-
ments. It turned out, however, that the triple hurdle was not as
insurmountable as one may have first believed.
Two major developments occurred after Nouvelles Frontires. The
first was the touching off of the latest stage of intermarket
liberalization5 7 which is expected to culminate at the end of 1992
under the impulsion of the Single European Act (the Act).58 The Act
56 Ministare Public v. Asjes, 1986 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1425, 1452, [1986] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 173, 207 (1986) (report of the Advocate General Lenz).
[In] the case of agreements concluded before the entry into force of the
EEC Treaty-or in the case of the newer member-States, before their
accession to the EEC-the rights of non-member countries and the obli-
gations of member-States continue to exist even if they are not compatible
with the EEC Treaty.
(footnote deleted). See, e.g., EEC Comm'n v. Italy, 1962 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1, 10, [1962] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 187, at 203. See also supra note 7 for dates of
entry into the EEC of each member state.
11 See Common Market begins to wrestle with rules to govern competition,
Aviation Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989 at 93.
"To date, the European Community's transport policy . . . has centered on liber-
alizing air transport and making it more competitive by degrees." See also, Wood,
Europe's liberalisation of air services: an update, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 269 (1988).
[The main impetus for the liberalization came] from airlines outside Europe;
from Far East airlines who have high standards and low costs and from
United State airlines who have the benefit of huge networks, a vast domestic
market and highly developed computerised reservations systems that have
greatly enhanced their ability to sell their services and give them great
commercial advantages over their competitors.
58 Single European Act, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987). The Act is
the latest phase in the EEC's effort to "complete the internal market." Completing
the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Council,
June 14, 1985, COM (85) 310 final. The purpose of the Act is to eliminate all
internal "frontiers" between the Member States in order to further the Community
objectives of the free movement of persons, goods and capital, which were enunciated
in 1957 and only gradually effectuated. EEC Treaty, supra note 6, at art. 3(c).
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allowed for voting by qualified majority in the Council on issues of
Common transport policy.5 9 This in turn paved the way for a concerted
Community effort to liberalize practices in the inter-European air
transport sector, thereby delegating to Community institutions certain
regulatory authority in the area. The authority is evidenced by the
second major development, promulgation in December 1987 of Coun-
cil Regulations 3975/87 and 3976/87 and Council Directives 87/601/
EEC and 87/602/EEC. 60
The effect of the Council measures was to allow Brussels to replace
the individual Member States in overseeing Community airline com-
petition. Council Regulation 3975/87 extends the provisions of Article
85 to the air transport sector by requiring undertakings and associ-
ations of undertakings to apply to the Commission for exemption
from the effects of the Article. Council Regulation 3976/87 allows
the Commission to grant categorical exceptions to Article 85(1) in
accordance with and in pursuit of the objectives enumerated in Article
85(3).61 The Council Directives address the flexibility of fare pricing
and the sharing of passenger capacity. 62 It is notable that the scope
59 Achieving total unanimity in the twelve member EEC, where national goals
and methods are often somewhat divergent and history weighs heavily, is no easy
task. See Black, Europe's Airlines Gear up for 1992, Europe: The Magazine of the
European Community, July/August 1989 at 31. Black states that "[in advance of
the 1992 deadline, the E.C. Commission drew up a list of more than 300 instruments
and laws required to harmonize national legislations. However, only about 100 have
so far been adopted, and the E.C. recognizes that total harmonization cannot take
place before 1995."
60 The measures adopted by the Council harmonized Community air transportation
policy in several domains. 30 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 374) 1-24 (1987). In the
area of airline price fixing for regularly scheduled flights, airlines are allowed the
flexibility of setting prices subject to Commission approval. "Pooling" between
airlines on particular city to city routes to allow airlines more flexibility in their
shares of particular routes is permitted; and opening up of access by new airlines
to existing routes is actively encouraged. Common Market Begins to Wrestle With
Rules to Govern Competition, Aviation Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989 at 93.
6, The objectives cited in paragraph (3) are the improvement of the "production
or distribution of goods" and the promotion of "technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit." EEC Treaty, supra
note 6, at art. 85(3).
62 30 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 374) 12-23 (1987). Also of interest are Commission
Regulations 2671/88, 2672/88 and 2673/88, promulgated in August 1988, which
apply the exemption provisions of Article 85(3)-which are now effective in the
domain of air transport by Council Regulation 3976/87-to allow airlines to cooperate
in the areas of passenger capacity, slot allocation, ground handling services, and
computer reservations for purposes of efficiency and public service. 31 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 239) 9-18 (1988).
19891
GA. J. INT'L & CoMip. L.
of the measures was restricted solely to "international air transport
between Community airports. "63 As a result, the regime in place with
respect to foreign carriers which had been established under Nouvelle
FrontiOres apparently was not affected, and the Member States con-
tinued to have sole regulatory authority over air transport with non-
EEC states.
III. COMMENT
The decision in Flugreisen placed the theory of the Member States'
exclusive airspace jurisdiction vis-A-vis non-member States into ques-
tion. In dictum, the Court noted that since the new Council measures
applied only to the category of international air transport that serves
points between Member States in the Community,6 all other air service
would remain within the Nouvelles Frontires regime. 65 Regulation
3975/87 allowed undertakings the opportunity to apply to the Com-
mission for an exemption from Article 85(1) and 85(2) as provided
for in 85(3). In interpreting the regulation, the Court held that it
provided for the possibility that Brussels could find an agreement of
an undertaking of the former (inter-Community) category to be au-
tomatically void under Article 85(2) in certain situations. 6
63 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at 6 (E. Comm.
Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989). The Court stated: "All those measures apply only to inter-
national air transport between Community airports .... Air transport services be-
tween airports in a given Member State and those between a Member State and a
non-member country are therefore excluded from the new rules."
6 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at 13 (E. Comm.
Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989) (Koopmans, Juge rapporteur).
65 The Court stated:
It must be inferred from [the Community rules] that domestic air transport
and air transport to and from airports in non-member countries continue
to be subject to the transitional provisions laid down in Articles 88 and
89, and that with respect to those air transport services the system described
in the [Nouvelles Frontires] judgment still applies.
Id. at 9.
"Article 85(2) would apply automatically where (1) no request for an exception
had been made; (2) the request was disapproved by the Commission within the 90
day time limit provided for in the regulation; or (3) the Commission had made no
decision within the 90 day time limit, but six years had passed without the entity
renewing its application for an exception to Article 85. The type of agreement that
would fall within the exception would not be binding on the parties to it, and it
would be open to any airline affected by the route in question. Ahmed Saeed
Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren
Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at 11-12 (E. Comm. Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989).
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As to how the abuse of a dominant position measure of Article
86 would apply to the airline industry the Court examined the language
of the Treaty. The Court noted that there was no provision in the
Article that would permit a public-interest exemption to its effects
in the same way that Article 85(3) allowed qualified exceptions to
85(1) and 85(2).67 Consequently, it held that the abuse of a dominant
position68 by an undertaking could in no way be excepted by either
a Member State or a Community institution under the terms of the
Treaty.69 Article 86 therefore continues to apply to the entire air
navigation sector without distinction between inter-Community flights
and "all other flights." ' 70 The Court went on to establish the rather
broad criteria used to define an airline's "dominant position" on the
transportation market:
67 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at 13 (E. Comm.
Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989). See also supra note 9.
68 The Court did recognize that in some cases such a position may be inevitable
under certain economic conditions. Therefore the competent national authorities have
to determine whether the prices charged by an airline, given all economic factors,
are inequitable in relation to its competition or its passengers. An inequitable price
may be one that is so low that it forces the competition out of the industry or one
that is so high as to be excessive.
Certain interpretative criteria for assessing whether the rate employed is
excessive may be inferred from Directive 87/601, which lays down the
criteria to be followed by the aeronautical authorities for approving tariffs.
It appears in particular from Article 3 of the directive that tariffs must be
reasonably related to the long-term fully allocated costs of the air carrier,
while taking into account the needs of consumers, the need for a satisfactory
return on capital, the competitive market situation, including the fares of
the other air carriers operating on the route, and the need to prevent
dumping.
Id. at 15-16.
69 [N]o exemption may be granted, in any manner whatsoever, in respect of
abuse of a dominant position; such abuse is simply prohibited by the Treaty
and it is for the competent national authorities or the Commission, as the
case may be, to act on that prohibition within the limits of their powers.
Id. at 13.
7o This is the interpretation drawn when reading paragraph 33 in conjunction
with paragraph 30.
[30] The first matter to be considered is whether for the purpose of the
application of Article 86 the same distinction has to be made as in the case
of Article 85, that is to say between international flights between airports
in the Member States and other flights ....
[331 It must therefore be concluded that the prohibition laid down in Article
86 of the Treaty is fully applicable to the whole of the air transport.
Id. at 12-13.
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The test to be employed is whether the scheduled flight on a par-
ticular route can be distinguished from the possible alternatives by
virtue of specific characteristics as a result of which it is not in-
terchangeable with those alternatives and is affected only to an
insignificant degree by competition from them.
7
1
In addressing the Member States' individual obligations the Court
applied its Nouvelles Frontires ruling. 72
The Court reaffirmed its holding that Member States remain obliged
under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty to respect the competition rules
of Articles 85 and 86 by not adopting or maintaining measures which
could reduce their effect. 73 Thus, the competent Member State au-
thorities must not encourage in any way airline tariff agreements
contrary to the EEC Treaty.7 4 At first blush, it does not appear that
this holding would permit a Community institution to overstep the
Article 234 hurdle and sanction a Member State for having entered
into a violative agreement with a non-Member State which contra-
vened Articles 85 or 8675 and which had come into effect before the
Member State's accession to the EEC. Nevertheless, in light of the
non-exceptability of Article 86 and the admonition of Article 5, the
Article 234 umbrella may not be entirely impermeable. The French
Merchant Seamen, LC. L, Wood pulp, Nouvelles Frontires and Flu-
"' Id. at 15.
72 See supra note 17.
11 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at 17 (E. Comm.
Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989). In the event that a Member State wishes to enforce Articles
85 and 86 against an undertaking on its own soil, it may do so as long as the
Commission has not already begun another similar prosecution itself. Council Reg-
ulation (EEC) No. 17, O.J. EuR. Comm. (No L. 13) 204 (1962), at art. 9; supra
note 9.
14 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at 17 (E. Comm.
Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989).
11 It seems that the language in Article 234(2) which encourages the Member
States to reconcile to the greatest extent practicable the discrepancies created by
agreements which antedate their accession to the EEC is a potential basis for a
Commission or Court finding that such air navigation agreements are invalid. This
would, however, constitute a significant break from the court's jurisprudence. See
supra note 54. But see Flag Carrier Concept May Vanish in Post-1992 Airline
Competition, Aviation Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989, at 151. Robert Ebdon,
British Airways general manager for commercial and governmental affairs, opines
that Article 234 will be effective in weakening the force of these bilateral agreements.
"[A]ir service agreements that provide for traffic between London and New York,
or Paris and Tokyo, will, in time, no longer specify that the routes be flown by
British or French carriers..."
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greisen line of decisions appears to create the potential for a Com-
munity institution to sanction a non-EEC air transport undertaking
under Article 86-even where there is a preexisting agreement between
the undertaking and a Member State (ostensibly protected by Article
234) that leads to the practice. It comes as no surprise that this
holding did not meet with unanimous approval from the Member
States.
The British government, as amicus curiae, expressed fears that the
viability of Article 86 in air transport could create a parallel com-
petition regime. It also voiced concern about the difficulty of de-
veloping objective criteria to apply to the sector as well as the potential
of vitiating long-standing international obligations .76 London's fear
of a parallel regime is not entirely unfounded. An airline operating
under an Article 85(3) exemption may not be able to conduct business
in a secure manner knowing that the Commission retains its Article
86 "ace in the hole." In such a highly regulated and fluctuating
market 77 as air transport, however, there naturally will be tension
between competing market and public goals. Exposure to a certain
degree of subjective standards is simply not obviable in a sector such
as the airline industry that does plays a role of extreme public interest.
Nevertheless, it is virtually inconceivable that a community institution
would blatantly override a bilateral agreement guaranteed by Article
234 to prosecute a foreign undertaking unless the alleged violation
were truly significant. In sum, the route that European anticompetitive
76 See supra note 9. In light of London's traditional opposition to Brussels'
centralizing regulatory tendencies, that the liberal-minded British government opposed
the European court's judgment comes as no surprise. It made several critical ob-
servations. First, absent Council or Commission measures adopted under Article 87,
the provisions of Article 88 guaranteeing Member States' sovereignty in the appli-
cation of articles 85 and 86 should ensure that the ordinary tribunals of the Member
States are not competent to apply Article 86. Articles 88 and 89 do not make a
distinction between Articles 85 and 86 as the Court had done. Also, where a dominant
position has resulted from an agreement between two independent companies, the
Court's interpretation of Article 86 would in effect create a parallel regime to that
of Article 85 and thus reduce the legal certainty which the Article 85(3) exemption
should provide. In addition, a tariff agreement between two airlines should not be
considered a per se abuse of a dominant position. Further, since the geographic
market and other competitive elements are so complex in the area of air transport,
it would be nearly impossible to formulate "concrete criteria" by which to apply
Article 86 to this sector. Finally, the British urged respect of Article 234 in the air
transport sector given the numerous bilateral agreements in effect prior to the Member
States' joining the Community. Addendum au rapport d'audience dans I'affaire 66/
86 3-5 (translation by author). See supra note 2.
11 See infra note 89.
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measures will adopt is not all too evident, but Brussels is leaving its
options open.
Non-EEC airlines and governments should monitor developing
Common Market measures regarding competition in the air transport
industry. Market forces are giving the EEC incentive to assert its
authority and "gain altitude" in the sector. 8 In light of the dynamism
that the global airline industry has experienced of late7 9 and the
Community's heightened aggressiveness in prosecuting foreign viol-
ators of its competition laws in other economic areas,80 non-Member
States' airline practices may soon come under closer EEC scrutiny.
Given the subjective nature of the Article 86 criteria defining abuse
of a dominant position, the Commission may consider a wide variety
of practices to be sanctionable as anti-competitive.8 1 For example,
the concentration of the United States airline industry and its tech-
nically superior computerized reservation system may provide Brussels
71 See Traffic aerien: le ciel se charge, Le Point, Feb. 12, 1989, at 90. The numbers
of the more than 1 billion voyagers who took to the air in 1988 are expected to
swell to 2 billion by the year 2,000.
79 See Flag Carrier Concept May Vanish in Post-1992 Airline Competition, Avi-
ation Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989, at 151, 155. "[Clompetition already is
hitting fares, and airline yields are expected to decline. Lufthansa officials expect
yields to drop 10-15% after 1992."
80 See, e.g., the Wood pulp case, supra note 52.
1I See Note, supra note 10. It may be of interest that Advocate Generals often
look to United States decisions to aid in their analyses before the Court. One case
addressing computerized reservations systems and their antitrust implications is United
Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1985). The Circuit
Court affirmed the C.A.B.'s authority to issue rules sanctioning the practice of
"biasing" airline computerized reservation systems which tended to deceive travel
agents and air travellers. These systems were created and owned by the airlines
themselves who charge for the inclusion of flights of competing airlines. "Unless
an airline limits its operations to one small region, it must, whether or not it has
its own computerized reservation system, persuade several of the largest airlines to
list its flights in their systems if it is to have a fair chance of competitive success."
Id. at 1114. In the U.S., there were six such systems in use at the time of the
decision with the largest share of the reservations market, 43% by revenue, held by
American Airlines. United Airlines' (United) was the next largest with 2707o. One
effect of United's practice was to give its flights de facto priority on the display
screens of its travel agent subscribers, to the detriment of other airlines listed on
United's service. Judge Posner held that the C.A.B. could use its discretion to
proscribe such practices "on the basis of common sense and experience. . ." Id. at
1112. Even though the airlines had no "monopoly position in the market for [the
reservation] service, and they are not accused of colluding," a finding that they
have "substantial market power" would place the practices within the C.A.B.'s
regulatory sphere. Id. at 1114.
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with an opportunity to test its extra-territorial prowess.8 2 Indeed, the
American airline industry, as a result of deregulation, has been con-
siderably streamlined (its safety record notwithstanding) and become
a source of apprehension for its European counterparts. The threat
of prosecution of American airlines may provide additional leverage
for the EEC in its demands for "cabotage rights" in the United
States. 83 However, there may be drawbacks to aggressive enforcement
by the EEC.
Pursuing a zealous extra-territorial anti-competition policy may not
be the ideal approach for several reasons. European airlines are
moving in the direction of greater concentration to better compete
in the world market.84 Commercial pressures may therefore induce
the Commission to ease its competition standards, much like the
American Department of Justice began minimizing its general antitrust
powers in the early 1980's. International reciprocity may thus dictate
prudence regarding prosecution of foreign entities. Also, employing
strict criteria in sanctioning foreign airlines for predatory practices
in the European markets may actually harm negotiations for liber-
alized access by European airlines to foreign markets. In addition,
82 See Air Service Rights Will Be Key Issue for U.S. Carriers in Europe, Aviation
Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989, at 160 (comments of Jon F. Ash). One U.S.
airline expert predicts that "because of their expertise, U.S. airlines are candidates
to establish accounting and reservations support offices [in Europe.]" See Black,
Europe's Airlines Gear up for 1992, Europe: The Magazine of the European Com-
munity, July/August 1989 at 31. Note that in the United States there were 105
airlines operating before 1978. After deregulation, 119 more entered the market, but
after six years market forces reduced the number of airlines to 75. Furthermore,
the top five U.S. airlines today carry over 70 percent of the passenger market.
83 See Air Service Rights Will Be Key Issue for U.S. Carriers in Europe, Aviation
Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989, at 159-60. In Europe, American airlines enjoy
certain Chicago Convention "fifth freedom" rights which permit them to fly pas-
sengers from the United States to European cities, where they may take on additional
passengers, and fly to other points within Europe. European governments have
traditionally been willing to grant such rights because of the importance of American
tourist dollars to their economies. The European airlines, however, do not enjoy
the same privileges in the United States. Lately, they have requested additional rights
in the U.S. by equating the fifth freedom rights granted U.S. carriers with the
practice of "cabotage." The right of cabotage, which is not recognized in the Chicago
Convention and is rarely permitted, is the granting by one country of the right of
a foreign airline to carry passengers from one point to another point within that
country. American unions, however, are opposed to such a practice in the U.S. and
criticize what they consider to be an opportunity to undercut their wages with cheaper
foreign labor.
", See Black, supra note 81, at 31. The International Labor Organization foresees
the "domination" of European aviation by five to seven "mega-airlines" by 1995.
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American s5 and other foreign antitrust authorities may play a part
in prosecuting airlines which engage in unfair trade practices on their
international routes, thus precluding EC prosecution. Furthermore,
European governments are already under attack for such public fund-
ing schemes as the subsidization of their aerospace industry. The
European "Airbus" joint venture, for example, has raised some ire
on the other side of the Atlantic.86 The recent spate of national and
international airline mergers and agreements may also become a source
of concern in Washington.8 7
11 See also Barlow, AVIATION ANTITRUST: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL Amt TRANSPORTATION(1988). In the United States in 1985 the Department of Transportation (DOT) replaced
the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) as the antitrust authority regulating
foreign air transportation. The DOT has general oversight of the agreements that
U.S. airlines make with foreign entities and of foreign airline flights to the U.S.
Its approval of tariff agreements and practices exempts American and foreign airlines
from possible anti-trust prosecution. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended
49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1542 (Supp. 1979); §§ 1452, 1551, 1601 (Supp. 1982); §§ 1301-
1555 (Supp. 1984). The DOT also has the power to annul antitrust immunity
previously granted by the CAB. See, e.g., Review of Air Carrier Agreements, Mergers,
Acquisitions of Control, Consolidations and Interlocking Relationships, 14 C.F.R.
pt. 303 (1989). See also 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1462-65 (Aug. 21, 1978).
President Carter supported the goal of an international air transportation system
founded upon the principle of free market forces dictating the goals and policies
of air services. This policy would be the basis of subsequent U.S. negotiations of
bilateral agreements.
" "Airbus Industrie consortium," consisting of manufacturers from Britain, France,
West Germany and Spain, is the primary international competitor of the U.S. aircraft
builders McDonnell Douglas Corp. and Boeing Co. U.S. officials estimate that the
group receives a total of $15 billion in European government aid (which the gov-
ernments claim will be recouped when the venture becomes profitable by 1995). The
consortium has come under heavy fire by the U.S. government for what it alleges
to be unfair trade practices. Airbus Consortium Announces New, Tighter Manage-
ment Structure, Reuter Bus. Rep., Mar. 21, 1989 (LEXIS, NEXIS library, Intl file).
'1 Cooperative airline agreements are in vogue. Flag carriers Air France and
Lufthansa, for example, have came to a "far-reaching co-operation agreement"
involving all aspects of their management, including joint negotiations with aircraft
manufacturers, development of long distance routes, catering, and computer reser-
vations. The move was characterized as being a response to British Airways' (Western
Europe's largest international airline) attempts to develop alliances with airline com-
panies in the U.S. and Europe. The companies say the agreement is "designed to
'prepare them for the year 2000 together' and for Europe's emerging single market."
They are also looking to include Iberia, Spain's national airline, in the partnership.
Air France, Lufthansa sign partnership pact, Financial Times (London), Sept. 16-
17, 1989, at 10. See Swissair and SAS to reveal link-up, Financial Times (London),
Sept. 28, 1989 at 17. Swissair and Scandinavian Airlines System came to a joint
co-operation agreement, characterized as "the latest move in the rapid reorganisation
of the European airline industry." SAS has also built ties with Continental Airlines,
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As for the future, not even the Commission is certain where it
will direct its competition policies .8 The Community will likely be
more active in air transport negotiations with non-EEC countries.
Nationalistic goals may not be entirely eliminated, however. 9 Yet,
as European airlines "supranationalize," the more centralized EEC
Commission will likely be the most effective means of regulating and
deregulating the market. 90 In light of the current political and eco-
nomic climate surrounding the air transport industry Flugreisen can
be considered neither as an outright threat to non-EEC air transport
competitors nor as a backing down from the challenge such com-
British Midland, All Nippon Airlines and Thai International. It was also "seeking
a partnership in Latin America with LanChile, the Chilean airline that is being
privatised."
[The move will make SAS and Swissair] more capable of facing with
confidence the intense competition that can now be expected with the
liberalisation of the EC airline market in the run-up to 1992. Both airlines
have recognised that neither can compete alone against the emerging trans-
national rivals, particularly after the recent Air France-Lufthansa tie-up.
In addition, following a cooperation agreement in March 1989, Swissair and Delta
Airlines have agreed to take five percent stock holdings in each other and increase
cooperation.
"8 See Common Market Begins to Wrestle With Rules to Govern Competition,
Aviation Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989, at 89-95. The European Community's
commissioner for competition, Sir Leon Brittan, professes uncertainty as to the
degree and direction of Brussels' airline competition policy. "We are working on
the basic principle that state aid distorts competition, and we are pushing to complete
our competition policy and have it in place by 1992." As to what positive steps the
EEC will eventually take to promote competition the commissioner finds it "difficult
to generalize .... We will proceed on a case-by-case basis."
89 Common Market Begins to Wrestle With Rules to Govern Competition, Aviation
Week & Space Tech., June 12, 1989, at 93.
Current European Community thinking-not yet embodied in any formal
document-is that some method of common negotiating [with the Com-
munity acting as negotiator for all E.C. members] is likely to work when
talks are being held with non-European Community European nations. ...
Most Community member states are not likely, however, to give up their
rights to get the best possible deal for themselves in negotiating with the
U.S. or Japan, which are seen as prime sources of tourist and business
traffic.
90 See Flag carrier concept may vanish in post-1992 airline competition, Aviation
Week & Space Tech. June 12, 1989, at 151.
[The admonition of article 234 that Member States work to eliminate sections
of existing international agreements that contravene the treaty, will likely]
bring about another change-multinational route negotiations with the Eur-
opean Commission negotiating air transport agreements for all member
states collectively. This prospect is not accepted by all airline officials, but
all agreed that some form of consultation between European Community
states on future route negotiations would be required.
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petition may pose. Importantly, the European airlines are losing their
status as protected flag carriers. Instead they are beginning act like
any other industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
In EEC terms, domestic and foreign airlines are beginning to look
less like public utilities and more like regular commercial ventures.
The French Merchant Seamen case established the principle that
Article 84 did not entirely insulate the transport sector from the
objectives of the EEC Treaty. 91 In the LC.L and Wood pulp holdings
the European Court guaranteed the Community institutions the au-
thority to address foreign undertakings who are legally present in an
EEC Member State under the territoriality principle. Then, the Nou-
velles Frontires decision extended this principle to the areas of air
transport and competition, yet softened its effects by applying the
"legal certainty" principle to the automatic language of Article 85.
The December 1987 Council measures only declawed the application
of Article 85 to extra-territorial flights, thereby maintaining the effect
of Article 86. It thus appears that the Flugreisen court, in holding
that Article 86 applies categorically to the "whole of the air transport
sector," 92 has left open the possibility that the EEC may apply the
abuse of a dominant position measures of Article 86 to non-European
Community airlines, regardless of preexisting agreements between the
undertakings and a Member State.
The holding in Flugreisen reflects the EEC's gradual entry into the
formerly taboo domain of air transport regulation. It affirms Brussels'
two-fold objective of furthering European economic integration
through inter-market liberalization, and of deepening the EEC's pen-
etration into the world air transport sector. The European Court's
cryptic affirmance of the applicability of Article 86 on an extra-
territorial basis is consistent with the precedent it set in its I.C.L
and Wood pulp decisions, though it does not further clarify the
jurisdictional criteria it established therein. In addition, the Court,
Council, and Commission have acknowledged both a legal basis and
a legitimate public interest in encouraging certain cartel-like practices.
To meet more concentrated and more efficient extra-Community
91 See supra note 21.
92 See supra note 71. Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reisburo GmbH
v. Zentrale zur Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., No. 66/86, slip op. at
13 (E. Comm. Ct. J. Apr. 11, 1989).
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competition, the EEC is encouraging a higher degree of inter-Com-
munity cooperation. With the lessons from American airline dereg-
ulation in mind, it seems also to have recognized that in order to
balance market forces with the public interest there can be no jus-
tification for the abuse of a dominant economic position. Indeed,
political and economic considerations affecting air transport will dic-
tate the direction in which Brussels navigates its air transport policy.
Meanwhile, European and foreign airlines seem to have lost their
status as wards of their respective states.
Richard S. Alembik

